Can market-clearing models explain U.S. labor market fluctuations? by Victor E. Li
1See Hansen and Wright
(1992) and Kydland (1995)
for a survey of this literature.
2Merz (1995) introduces such
time delays in the form of cost-
ly search in the labor market
while Christiano and Todd












odern business cycle theories are
evaluated on the basis of their ability
to explain key empirical features of
the post-war U.S. business cycle.  The failure
of nonmarket-clearing macro models to
account for the rise of unemployment and
inﬂation in the early 1970s led to the rise of
New Classical explanations of the business
cycle.  In particular, the real business cycle
(RBC) approach has received much attention
in economics because it provides microeco-
nomic foundations for macroeconomic
behavior and emphasizes the importance
of a quantitative evaluation of the theory’s
predictions.  RBC theory shows how ﬂuc-
tuations in macroeconomic aggregates
(recessions and booms) can result from
the optimal response of businesses and
households to real economic disturbances
to technology.  These theories are based
upon the market-clearing assumption that
prices rapidly adjust to demand and supply
conditions.  Kydland and Prescott (1982)
and Long and Plosser (1983) demonstrated
that such an approach could explain impor-
tant facts regarding U.S. business cycles.
Using a standard model of economic growth
with empirically plausible shocks to aggre-
gate productivity, or technology shocks,
their artiﬁcial economies generated business
cycles remarkably similar to the actual
economy.
While successful at replicating some
key business cycle features, one of the pri-
mary weaknesses of standard RBC models
is their inability to account for some impor-
tant aspects of U.S. labor market ﬂuctuations.
For example, the standard framework is
unable to generate sufﬁcient volatility of
hours worked, relative to output and
average labor productivity.  It vastly over-
states the contemporaneous correlation
between hours and productivity, and it
cannot account for the feature that labor
productivity tends to lead hours worked over
the business cycle. As a result, researchers in
the past decade have focused on modifying
the RBC framework to address these short-
comings.1 One example pursued by
Hansen (1985) is to treat labor supply as
an indivisible decision (a decision to work
or not to work), and hence, introduce
equilibrium unemployment.  Such an
approach alters the individual trade-off
between work and leisure over time, which
makes labor supply more responsive to
changes in the real-wage rate.  Another
direction is to incorporate additional shocks
to the economy, such as changes in govern-
ment spending (Christiano and Eichenbaum,
1992) or shocks to a home production
technology (Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright,
1991).  This not only makes labor supply
more variable over time but lowers the
correlation between hours worked and real
wages.  Finally, time lags between when a
ﬁrm decides to hire labor or buy capital,
and when those inputs become productive,
could dampen the contemporaneous response
of labor to a technology shock and, there-
fore, cause productivity to lead hours over
the business cycle.2
This article will ﬁrst summarize facts
about U.S. business cycles and evaluate
how a basic RBC model compares with
these facts.  Second, it will look at how a
RBC model with indivisible labor supply is
constructed and analyze its predictions for
the labor market.  Finally, it will develop a
simple framework that demonstrates how
a more realistic treatment of unemployment
and incomplete risk sharing in an RBC
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model may provide an alternative approach
to better account for these U.S. labor
market facts.  In particular, building upon
the RBC model with indivisible labor, our
framework looks at the situation where the
risk of being unemployed cannot be com-
pletely shared across all individuals
(unemployment insurance is incomplete).
U.S. BUSINESS CYCLES AND
SOME LABOR MARKET FACTS
Figures 1-3 and the ﬁrst rows of Tables
1-4 document some important U.S.
business cycle properties based upon quar-
terly time-series data.  The data are logged
and detrended (using the Hodrick and
Prescott ﬁlter, 1980) so that business
cycles are measured as deviations of macro
variables around this trend.  Real GDP is
denoted by Y, the expenditure aggregates
are consumption (C) and gross private
domestic investment (I), and the labor
market variables are total hours worked
(H) and average labor productivity (PR –––
Y/H).  Table 1 summarizes the relative
volatility of these aggregates and shows the
well-known fact that while consumption is
about half as volatile as income (sC/sY= 0.51),
total business and residential investment
ﬂuctuates about three times as much as
income (sI/sY= 3.14).  In terms of the
labor market, Table 1 indicates that hours
ﬂuctuate almost as much as output (s H/sY
= 0.79), labor productivity is about half 
as volatile (sPR/sY= 0.46), and hours ﬂuc-
tuate more than one and a half times as











Dynamic Correlation of Output and Hours
Corr(Yt,Ht+j)
j = -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
U.S. Data* .30 .53 .76 .90 .88 .74 .58
RBC Model .34 .51 .72 .98 .63 .35 .14
CRS Model .33 .50 .72 .98 .62 .34 .14
ICRS-1 Model .33 .50 .72 .98 .63 .35 .14
ICRS-2 Model .31 .51 .74 .95 .88 .52 .24
*U.S. data uses chain-weighted logged and HP ﬁltered quarterly time series, 1964:1 – 1994:4, constructed by Pakko (1997).  Y = real 
GDP, C = consumption of nondurables and services, I = ﬁxed nonresidential + consumer durables, H = total hours worked, PR = Y/H = 
average labor productivity.FEDERALRESERVEBANKOFST. LOUIS
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3Others, e.g., Kydland (1995),
using the establishment survey
of hours worked, have found
this leading role of productivity
over the cycle to be more
prominent than that indicated
by this table.
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The ﬁrst rows of Tables 2-4 contain
the dynamic correlation of our selected
labor market variables with three-quarter
lags and leads.  It highlights four important
features.  First, Figure 1 and Table 2 show
that total hours are highly procyclical
[Corr(Yt,Ht) = 0.90].  Additionally, Table 3
indicates that it is more procyclical than
productivity [Corr(Yt,PRt) = 0.61].  Second,
Table 3 shows that while the correlation
between output and productivity peaks
contemporaneously, it is very close to the
one-and two-period lagged correlations.
Along with Figure 2, this suggests that
productivity may lead the cycle weakly.3
Third, the contemporaneous correlation
between hours and labor productivity is
small [Corr(Ht,PRt) = 0.22].  Fourth, Table
4 and Figure 3 show very clearly that pro-
ductivity leads hours over the cycle
[Corr(Ht,PRt) < Corr(Ht,PRt-1) < Corr
(Ht,PRt-2)].  These four features suggest
that labor productivity is an important
indicator of future economic activity.
These U.S. summary statistics given by
the ﬁrst rows of Tables 1-4 will be the bench-
markwith which we evaluate the performance
of market-clearing RBC models.  In partic-
ular, the article will ﬁrst evaluate how the
basic RBC model, given by the second rows
of the tables, compares to these U.S. labor
market facts.  Next, we analyze the indivisible
labor model with complete risk-sharing
(CRS) and summarize these results in rows
three of Tables 1-4. Finally, the paper
builds upon this CRS model of indivisible
labor by considering the more general case
of incomplete risk sharing (IRS) between
employed and unemployed individuals.
Summary statistics for two versions of the
IRS model are presented in the fourth and
ﬁfth rows of the tables.
Table 4









Dynamic Correlation of Output and Productivity
Corr(Yt,PRt+j)
j= -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
U.S. Data* .43 .51 .56 .61 .37 .19 .01
RBC Model .17 .38 .64 .98 .74 .54 .37
CRS Model .01 .23 .51 .87 .75 .64 .52
ICRS-1 Model .03 .24 .52 .88 .75 .63 .51
ICRS-2 Model .18 .41 .72 .81 .46 .40 .32FEDERALRESERVEBANKOFST. LOUIS
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A BASIC RBC MODEL AND
THE FACTS
In a prototypical RBC framework,
households behave as if they live forever.
They care about current and expected-
future consumption as well as current and
expected-future leisure.  The typical form
of preferences adopted in the literature is a
time-separable utility function where indi-
viduals discount the future:
(1)
where ctand ltare consumption and
leisure, respectively, at date t, utility is
increasing in cand lbut also exhibiting
diminishing marginal utility and b  < 1 is
the time discount factor.
Households earn income at each date by
working ht= 1-ltunits at a wage rate wtand
renting capital ktto ﬁrms at a rental rate rt.
At each date they spend their income buying
goods for consumption and investment, It.
This leads to the following ﬂow-budget
constraint that equates income to expendi-
tures at date t:
(2)
Gross investment is deﬁned as new capital
goods available at date t+1 less the
undepreciated existing capital stock:
(3)
where d  < 1  is the capital depreciation rate.
Households maximize expected lifetime
utility in equation 1 by choosing ct, It, and
lt, subject to the budget constraint given by
equation 2, and taking as given the market
wage and capital rental rates.
Firms in this economy demand labor,
ht
d, and capital, kt
d, to produce output yt
using a Cobb-Douglas production
technology given by
(4)
where output is increasing in capital and labor
inputs and exhibits diminishing marginal
returns in each, and Atis a productivity
shock to this technology.  The random
process for these productivity shocks is
given by At= exp(zt) where zt+1= r zt+ e t+1,
etis a serially uncorrelated disturbance
with zero mean and constant variance s 2
e
and r  < 1 measures the degree of persistence
of the shock.
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current period is not productive until the
following period.  Firms maximize proﬁts
and will demand labor and capital goods
until the wage rate is equated to the
marginal product of labor and the rental
rate is equated to the marginal product of
capital.  The assumption of market-
clearing ensures that factor prices will
adjust to equate the demand and supply of
labor, capital, and goods (i.e., ht= ht
d, kt=
kt
d, and yt= ct+ It).
A temporary unanticipated positive
shock to Atcreates substitution effects on
household behavior along two dimensions.
First, the increase in the marginal product
of capital provides an incentive to increase
investment and intertemporally substitutes
current for future consumption.  Secondly,
the productivity shock raises the marginal
product of labor.  Households respond to
this by substituting leisure for current and
future consumption.  The overall impact
will be a higher equilibrium rental rate, real
wage, greater consumption, investment,
work effort, and output during the period
of the shock.  Productivity disturbances
are sometimes called the impulse to the
business cycle, while the investment
process is the mechanism that propagates
these shocks over time.4
The model is then calibrated by solving
it numerically, assigning parameter values,
and simulating it over time (under the
assumption that individuals have rational
expectations regarding future economic
variables).5Productivity shocks to
technology are assumed to be temporary,
but also persistent.  The outcome is an
artiﬁcial time series of economic aggregates
that can be compared to the facts about
U.S. business ﬂuctuations.6
The second rows of Tables 1-4 give the
predictions of the standard RBC model that
can be directly compared to the data displayed
in the ﬁrst rows.  Several predictions of the
model do quite well.  First, the volatility of
consumption is signiﬁcantly less than that
of output while investment is substantially
more volatile than output.  Intuitively,
because individuals are forward looking,
they desire to spread consumption over
time as dictated by the permanent income
hypothesis.  Secondly, Table 2 shows that
hours are strongly procyclical (even a bit
more than the data indicate).
It also is clear from these tables that
the major difﬁculties of the model rest in
the labor market.  First, the model cannot
explain why hours are so volatile (sH/s Yis
0.51 in the model and 0.79 in the data).
Second, the model overstates the procyclical
nature of average labor productivity
(Corr(Yt,PRt) is 0.98 in the model and 0.61
in thedata) and says that productivity is
strongly contemporaneous with output
while the data say that it is only weakly
contemporaneous.  Third, hours are more
volatile than productivity in the data but
less volatile in the model (sH/s PR = 0.95 in
the model and 1.72 in the data).  Fourth,
the model vastly overstates the correlation
between current hours and productivity
(0.93 in the model and 0.22 in the data)
and it is unable to explain why productivity
leads hours over the cycle (the data show
hours to be the most correlated with three-
quarters lagged productivity).
Why does the standard RBC model have
so much trouble explaining these labor
market facts?  The answer lies in Figure 4.
Productivity shocks, which alter the mar-
ginal product of capital, can be viewed as
shifts in labor demand along an upward
sloping labor supply curve.  In particular,
4It has been argued, however,
that this propagation mecha-
nism is weak because persis-
tence in the technology shock
itself is essential to generate a
realistic amount of persistence
in real output growth.
5We use log utility and parame-
ters that are standard to the lit-
erature: u(c,1-h)= ln(c)
+ Aln(1-h), A=2, a  =
0.36, b  = 0.99, 
d  = 0.025, r  = 0.95,
and se = 0.00721.
6For more information, readers
are directed to a detailed
description of the process of
solving, calibrating, and simu-
lating RBC models contained in
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7The labor-supply elasticity
required for the model to gener-
ate sufﬁcient hours to output
volatility is close to two while
empirical estimates suggest it is
signiﬁcantly less than one.
8This approach addresses the
observation that about two-
thirds of variations in hours
worked come from individuals
moving into and out of unem-
ployment with only one-third
from variations in hours when
employed.
9Introducing an all-or-nothing
employment decision will imply
that the competitive structure
of the economy may not corre-
spond with a Pareto efﬁcient
equilibrium, i.e., an allocation
where no one can be made bet-
ter off without others being
made worse off.  Technically,
allowing individuals to choose
the probability of unemploy-
ment, and having a lottery to
determine who will actually be
unemployed is necessary to cir-
cumvent the problem of non-
convexitiesin the labor-supply
decision.  (For more details the
reader is directed to Hansen
[1985], pp 315-16.)
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using model parameters values based upon
actual empirical evidence leads to a small
intertemporal elasticity of substitution
between consumption and leisure, and
hence, a small labor supply elasticity (i.e.,
the labor supply curve is rather steep).7
As a result, we see:
• Equilibrium hours will not be very 
responsive.
• Real wages, and hence marginal and 
average labor productivity, will 
change by more than hours.
• Technology shocks, which shift labor 
demand along labor supply, cause 
real wages and productivity to be 
almost perfectly correlated andcon-
temporaneous with changes in output.
INDIVISIBLE LABOR IN A
RBC MODEL
An important innovation to the real
business cycle literature—aimed at
resolving some of the inconsistencies
between the basic model and the data—is
to assume that labor supply is indivisible so
that individuals are either working or not
working, i.e., employed or unemployed.8
In particular, individuals each face a
random chance of being unemployed.  The
model assumes that ﬁrms offer labor con-
tracts that are traded competitively.  These
contracts provide for unemployment insur-
anceby specifying a guaranteed income
ﬂow to each individual worker, regardless
of whether that worker is employed or
unemployed. This income agreed upon by
workers and ﬁrms, however, is contingent
upon the probability, chosen by the worker,
of being employed or unemployed in the
current period.  Such an environment will
be equivalent to one where individuals insure
each other against the random outcome of
being unemployed; that is, the market for
unemployment insurance provides a means
to attain risk sharing.9
Hansen (1985) formalizes such an
approach by considering the case where 
all individuals are identical in terms of
skills and productivity, but each faces a
random chance in each period of being
employed with probability ntand working
Lhours or unemployed with probability 1-nt,
and working zero hours (i.e., there is an
employment lottery).  At the beginning of
each period, individuals choose ntto maxi-
mize the average of utility they receive if
they should be employed or unemployed,
weighted by their respective probabilities:
(5)
where c1tand c2tare the individual's
consumption choices contingent upon the
realization of working and not working,
respectively.  
Risk sharing is captured by a budget
constraint that equates an individual’s
expected income ﬂow to his expected
expenditures in the current
(6)
The left-hand side of equation 6 is the
sum of expected labor income over individual
employment status and household rental
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expenditures on consumption over the
employment lottery and household invest-
ment.10To maximize utility, subject to the
budget constraint, individuals simply choose
employment probability nt, consumption
plans c1tand c2t(which are contingent
upon the outcome of the employment lot-
tery), and investment.  Firms in this
economy own production technology in
equation 4 and demand labor and capital
in exactly the same manner as in the basic
model.  Since each representative ﬁrm
employs many workers, aggregate labor
supply is given by ntLhours and a labor
market equilibrium occurs when  ntL= ht
d.
This formulation of the model embodies
the idea of complete risk-sharing (CRS).  If
it is costless to set up the insurance market
for unemployment, and utility is separable
in consumption and leisure, then the most
beneﬁcial arrangement is to provide for
complete unemployment insurance.  Such
a situation entails that individuals receive
the same income and consume identical
amounts regardless of their employment
status.  Since this (costless) pooling of
incomes implies that individuals would
like to insure each other perfectly against
unemployment and each is equally likely
to be unemployed, the consumptions of
employed and unemployed individuals are
equalized, i.e., c1t= c2tfor all t.
Figures 5-7 show the impulse response
plots of how selected variables in this CRS
model respond to a one-period, one-standard
deviation positive shock to Atwhich persists
over several quarters.  The shock occurs in
period 10 and the vertical axes of Figures
5-7 measure the percent deviation from
steady-state values.  All variables eventually
converge back to their corresponding steady-
state values following the one-time shock.
Figure 5 indicates that the technology shock
raises both employed and unemployed
consumption by the same amount above
their respective long-run values.  Figure 6
shows a boom in investment expenditures
in the period of the shock.  As Figure 7
indicates, the responses of both output and
hours worked are greatest in the period of
the shock, while the surge in productivity
gradually falls back to steady state.  Thus,
productivity certainly does not lead output
over the business cycle and its correlation
with hours worked is strongly positive.
These cyclical properties are quantiﬁed
in the third rows of Tables 1-4.11As Table
1 shows, sH/s Y = 0.76.  This means that
the model does succeed in increasing the
volatility of hours worked to a level very
close to the data.  It also explains why
hours ﬂuctuates more than productivity.
In fact, the statistic sH/s PR  = 2.63is now
too high, rather than too low, relative to
the data.  Intuitively, because an individu-
al’s labor supply is all or nothing at all, the
aggregate labor supply elasticity can be
much larger than the elasticity at the indi-
10Since there are a large number
of households, the budget con-
straint (equation 6) also says
that aggregate income must be
equal to aggregate expenditures
(i.e., it also corresponds to an
aggregate resource constraint). 
11To be comparable to Hansen
(1985), we use L= 0.53;
otherwise, the utility and 
production function as well 
as parameter values are identical
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vidual level.12Figure 8 illustrates these labor
market effects of a shock to technology
with a larger aggregate labor supply elasticity.
Finally, Table 4 indicates that although the
correlation between hours and productivity
is somewhat lower in this model than in
the standard RBC model (Corr(Ht, PRt) =
0.76), it is still signiﬁcantly larger than the
correlation in the U.S. data.  The strongest
correlation between these two series is
contemporaneous, rather than one in
which productivity leads hours.
In the following section, we will build
upon the RBC model with indivisible
labor.  In particular, we will suggest how a
more realistic treatment of the income
constraints that unemployed individuals
face—and the notion of incomplete risk




In the indivisible labor model with
complete risk sharing, individuals insure
each other perfectly against variations in
income due to unemployment.  Such a
frictionless market, however, also rules out
potentially important liquidity constraints
that unemployed individuals may face, and
hence distorts how labor-supply decisions
respond to aggregate shocks.  This section
provides an example of how incomplete
risk sharing may improve upon the model’s
labor market predictions by considering the
more natural case where the unemployed
do not have direct access to current labor
income.
In our example, the unemployment
insurance market of the typical indivisible
labor model is replaced with a simple one-
period loan market, which permits borrowing
and lending between individuals.  The
major source of friction in this loan market
is that individuals make deposits,dt, before
the uncertainty about the state of the
economy, i.e., the technology shock, At, is
resolved.  For example, there may be bro-
ker’s fees, shoe leather, or other ﬁxed costs
of continuously adjusting these deposits
once the initial decision is made.13Also,
there is a resource cost of participating in
this loan market, s, which is proportional
to the size of dt.  This is meant to capture an
implicit opportunity cost of making deposits
relative to an outside alternative.This cost
is rebated as a lump-sum transfer to house-
holds (which own the intermediaries) at
the end of the period.  Finally, individuals
face a competitive market interest rate, Rt,
on both deposits and loans.
Once the state of the economy is real-
ized, individuals choose an employment
probability. Then an employment lottery
randomly assigns individuals to be employed
or unemployed.  While all individuals
JULY/AUGUST1999
12This partially addresses the criti-
cism that RBC models require a
large individual labor supply
elasticity, but the required elas-
ticity is still above one.
Kydland and Prescott (1991)
consider the case where individ-
uals can vary both employment
choice and hours worked.  With
ﬂuctuations in hours coming
from both margins, they arrive
at a much more plausible ﬁgure
for the relative volatility of
hours to productivity. 
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have equal access to rental income, unem-
ployed individuals do not work and have
no direct access to labor income.  They are
constrained to consume from their rental
income and funds borrowed from the loan
market, b2t.  Employed individuals, on 
the other hand, can consume and purchase
capital goods from their rental and labor
income as well as any additional funds
they decide to borrow from the ﬁnancial




which takes into account that the income
that individuals have available is net of
their initial deposit decision.  In place of
equation 6, the average or aggregatebudget
constraint that allows individuals to pool
their resources together, and hence share
risk, is now given by
(8)
The left-hand side of equation 8 is total
expenditures by employed and unemployed
individuals on consumption, interest payments
on loans,household investment, and the
implicit costs of participating in the loan
market.  The right-hand side is total income
from wages earned by the employed, house-
holdrental income, interest on deposits, and
lump-sum transfers of the ﬁnancial market
proﬁts, Pt= sdt.14Since interest is paid on
these loans at the end of the period, and
no assets or IOUs are traded across periods,
this is an intratemporal rather than intertem-
poralloan market.  It simply permits
individuals to smooth consumptionagainst
realizations of their employment status.
Thus, while risk sharing guaranteesthat
individuals are identical at the beginningof
every period, or ex ante, an unanticipated
aggregate shock causes their consumption
decisions to differ based upon the random
realization of their employment status, and
hence they may not be identical ex post. 
Individuals take wages, rental rate, and
loan market rates as given.  They choose
deposits (before the technology shock), an
employment probability, consumption con-
tingent on the realization of employment,
and investment to maximize lifetime utility
(equation 5), subject to budget constraints
given in equations 7 and 8.  Firms in this
economy own the production technology
(equation 4) and demand labor and capital
in exactly the same manner as in the previous
section.  As in the CRS model, labor market
equilibrium occurs when ntL= ht
d.  There
is an additional market-clearing condition
n  c  n  c  I  R
n  b  n  b  sd
w  n  L  r  k  R  d
t  t  t  t  t  t
t  t  t  t  t
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14In an economy with many iden-
tical intermediaries, households
take these proﬁts as a lump-
sum quantity when they make
their decisions.  That is, Ptis
taken as given when house-
holds choose deposit, consump-
tion, and labor supply decisions


























Timefor the loan market that equates total ﬁnan-
cialmarket deposits to loans, and is given
by dt= ntb1t+ (1-nt)b2t.  In equilibrium, as
long as Rt> 0, it will never be optimal for
employed individuals to borrow in order
to ﬁnance their consumption so that b1t= 0.
We will now summarize the major results
of this set up, leaving the technical aspects
of solving the model to the appendix.
First, consider the situation where there
is no uncertainty about the aggregate state
of productivity when the deposit decision
is made (dtis chosen after Atis known),
and there are no loan market participation
costs (s= 0).  This is the special case where
risk sharing is complete both across and
within periods so that c1t= c2tfor all dates
t, and the model is identical to the CRS
model of Hansen (1985) considered above.
The loan market simply is acting as a transfer
mechanism between employed and unem-
ployed individuals and hence provides
complete insurance against aggregate
shocks to production and income.  Figure 9
gives the impulse response plot of deposits
to a positive shock to technology.  Since
the shock lowers unemployment, and
there is no uncertainty about the shock
when deposit decisions are made, supply
and demand for these loans fall in equal
amounts while the loan market interest
rate remains constant (see Figure 10).
Next, consider the case where there are
small but positive costs for participating in
this loan market (s> 0), but still no uncer-
tainty about the economy when deposits
are made.  In this case, the consumption of
unemployed individuals now is lower than
that of the employed, c2t< c1t, because it is
costly for the loan market to transfer income
across individuals.  We call this form of
incomplete risk sharing the ICRS-1 model.
The impulse response plots are practically
identical to those contained in Figures 5-7
(and omitted).  The fourth rows of Tables
1-4 show that the cyclical properties of
ICRS-1 indeed are very similar to the CRS
model.  Intuitively, as the state of the
economy is observed when borrowing and
lending decisions are made, risk is still
shared efﬁciently (but not completely)
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pating in the loan market make little differ-
enceto the dynamic effects of technology
shocks.  Hence, the labor market effects of
ICRS-1 also can be illustrated by Figure 8.
Finally, we consider the form of
incomplete risk sharing where there is
uncertainty about the aggregate state of the
economy when deposit decisions are made
(dtchosen before Atis realized).  Impulse
responses to a one standard deviation posi-
tive-technology shock for this ICRS-2 model
are shown in Figures 11-15.  While the
consumption of both employed and unem-
ployed increases in Figure 11, unemployed
consumption deviates from its long-run value
by a greater percentage during the period
of the shock.  The reasoning is that loan
market equilibrium requires dt =b2t(l - n).
Intuitively, since the supply of loanable
funds, dt, is ﬁxed and cannot react in the
period of the shock, the reduction of
unemployment (1-nt) reduces the total
demand for loans by the unemployed and
the loan market interest rate (Figures 14
and 16).  Thus, the cost of ﬁnancing con-
sumption loans for each unemployed
individual decreases and borrowing per
unemployed individual, b2t, rises.  This has
the effect of dampening the initial increase
in hours and investment, as shown in Fig-
ures 12 and 15.  As a result, productivity
surges in the period of the shock while
investment, hours, and output continue to
rise during the period following the shock.
Interestingly, the fact that output rises for
two periods after the shock suggests that
incomplete risk sharing strengthens a
propagation mechanism, which is inherently
weak in a standard RBC framework.
These features are captured more pre-
cisely in the model’s summary statistics in
the ﬁfth rows of Tables 1-4.  Table 1 indi-
cates that the relative volatilities of each
variable to output change very little when
compared to the complete risk sharing
case; however, the volatility of hours to
productivity is now much lower (1.90
rather than 2.63 in CRS) and closer to the
data. The dynamic correlations are now
able to replicate several important features
suggested by the impulse response diagrams.
First, Table 4 shows that productivity leads
hours with the peak correlation occurring
between current hours and one period
lagged productivity.  Secondly, Table 4 also
indicates that the contemporaneous corre-
lation between hours and productivity of
0.59 is signiﬁcantly lower than that in the
CRS model.  Third, the contemporaneous
correlation between output and productivity
in Table 3 is lowered and the output-one
period lagged productivity correlation is
much stronger and closer to its contempo-
raneous correlation.
Again, some intuition behind these
labor-market predictions can be obtained
from a labor-market equilibrium diagram
(Figure 17).  Consider a negativeunantici-
pated shock to technology.  Given the









5  25  45  65  85












5  25  45  65  85






Timeunanticipated shock, the increase in the
loan market interest rate diminishes the
incentives to be unemployed.  In an actual
economy, this may correspond to situations
where unemployed individuals face tighter
liquidity constraints or an increased likeli-
hood of being turned down for loans in a
recession.15The employmentresponse still
leads to a larger labor elasticitycompared to
the standard RBC model, because of the
indivisible labor.  But the elasticity is still
smaller compared to CRS, because of the
incomplete risk sharing.  As labor demand
shifts backwards, hours will fall by more
than wages and productivity, but it will not
overstate this feature as in CRS.  In the
period following the shock, supply to the
loan market rises and this increases the
incentives to enjoy leisure andfinance con-
sumption through loans.  Thus,while
labor demand begins to return to its orig-
inal value, labor supply actually shifts
backwards and hours and wages move in
opposite directions.  Consequently, the
contemporaneous correlation between pro-
ductivity and hours falls and equilibrium
hours and output may continue to fall after
the technology shock.  It is this channel of
dampening the initial response of labor
supply to aggregate shocks that causes
changes in productivity to lead changes in
hours worked over the business cycle.
CONCLUSION
Real business cycle theory has
demonstrated that a simple neoclassical
model of economic growth with supply-
side disturbances can have remarkable
success in explaining important business
cycle facts.  This article presents some
basic U.S. labor market facts and explains
why the labor market predictions of the
basic RBC model have been received by
many with skepticism.  It also shows how
the inclusion of indivisible labor and
unemployment into an RBC model can
improve these labor market predictions.
Finally, it suggests that a more explicit
treatment of incomplete risk sharing may
help resolve some of the model’s more
problematic labor market predictions.
Among them are that productivity tends to
lead hours over the cycle, the low hours-
productivity contemporaneous correlation,
and the high relative volatility of hours
worked to productivity.
This paper also draws interesting par-
allels to the time-to-plan speciﬁcation of
Christiano and Todd (1996)—where cap-
ital goods are not productive until several
periods after the investment decision is
made—and Merz (1995), who incorporates
labor market search into RBC models.  All
of these approaches, including our example
of incomplete risk sharing, emphasize features
of the economy that dampen the response
of production factors to aggregate shocks.
They also help in better matching the
15The idea that economic down-
turns may lead to a decrease in
net worth and magnify agency
costs and credit rationing has
been emphasized in the busi-
ness lending context by
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movement of hours and productivity to
output and each other over the business
cycle.  The main idea behind our example
simply is that not permitting unemployed
individuals the same access to income and
consumption opportunities as those employed
signiﬁcantly affects how aggregate labor
supply reacts to uncertain economic shocks.
The results in the paper suggest that an
explicit treatment of frictions in both the
labor and ﬁnancial markets and their inter-
actions may be a fruitful direction for
future research when evaluating the labor
market performance of market-clearing
business cycle models.
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This appendix formalizes the solution
to the incomplete risk sharing model.  The
technology shock At= exp(zt) where ztfol-
lows a stationary AR(1) process:
(A1)
and e1is a pure white noise disturbance
with zero mean and constant variance se
2.
Given u(ct,1t) = u(c) + V(1 - L) where u(c)
= ln(c) and V(1 - L) the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions for {c1t, c2t, dtb1t, b2b, nt,kt+ 1}
associated with maximizing equation 5








where l1 and l 2 are multipliers for the
budget constraint given in equation 8 and
the unemployed consumption constraint
(equation 7).  Notice from equations A2
and A3 that l2= (1-nt)[u¢(c2t) - u¢(c1t)].
Thus, a necessary and sufﬁcient condition
for unemployment consumption constraint
in equation 7 to bind is given by c2t < c1t.
The time t-1 expectations operator in
equation A4 indicates that d1is chosen
before productivity shock ztis realized.
Notice that if s= 0, then the model is com-
pletely standard with l 2t = 0 and c2t = c1t.
From these we can immediately rule out
several cases with regard to the borrowing
decision of employed and unemployed
individuals.  It is straightforward to verify
that a sufﬁcient condition to rule out b1t>
0  is given by Rt > 0.  The case where b1t =
b2t= 0 is possible if and only if complete
risk sharing can be achieved without use
of the loan market; however, this case can
be ruled out quantitatively given the
steady state consumption and income
levels implied by the model parameteriza-
tion.  This leaves us with the most natural
case of b1t = 0 and b2t > 0   Equations A2,
A3, and A6 give us Rt= [u¢(c2t) - u¢(c1t)]/
u¢(c1t).  Substituting these and the market-





Equations A9, A10, and A11 give the efﬁ-
ciency condition for nt, kt+1, and dt.  To
obtain some intuition behind these condi-
tions we must ﬁrst consider the case where
dtis chosen after the productivity shock.
If s= 0, then c1t= c2t, and these conditions
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Appendixindivisible labor.  While risk is still shared
efﬁciently for s > 0, it is costly to
participate in the loan market, and from
equation A11, c2t < c1t, Rt > 0 and the
unemployment consumption constraint in
equation 7 binds.  Quite intuitively, this
binding constraint increases the marginal
beneﬁt of an additional worker and an
additional unit of capital, as captured by
the fourth term in equation A9 and the
second term in the expectations operator
in equation A10.  Finally, if dt is chosen
before the productivity shock is revealed,
the previous statements hold only in
expected value terms because risk sharing
will be incomplete.  For example, if the
productivity shock is unexpectedly high,
then the unemployment consumption con-
straint in equation 7 binds less than
expected, thereby implying a lower-than-
average marginal beneﬁt to additional
workers and capital during the period of
the shock.  It is this feature that will
generate quantitatively different results rel-
ative to the complete risk sharing case.
To be comparable to previous real busi-
ness cycle studies (e.g. Hansen and Wright,
1992) we choose a = 0.36, b = 0.99, s = 0.025,
L = 0.53, r = 0.95, and se = 0.00721.  The
transactions cost variable s is chosen to be
0.0058 so that the steady-state loan market
interest rate corresponds to the rate of time
preference.  The models are solved by lin-
earizing Euler equations A8, A9, and A10
about the model’s steady state.
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